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DYING FOR DOLLARS:
HEALTH EQUITY IN THE AGE OF REFORM
MAX D. SIEGEL ∗
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient
2
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 1 into law. Almost instantly,
fourteen state attorneys general joined together to file suit to challenge
ACA in federal courts in Virginia and Florida. 3 These states took action
amid widespread political rhetoric that condemned Congress for shattering
its constitutional limits by invading citizens’ private decisions to purchase
health insurance. 4 The rhetoric appears to have worked 5: Public opinion
polls have never shown a majority of U.S. citizens in favor of ACA, 6 and
decrying reform has become a common tactic in American politics.7

Copyright © 2011 by Max D. Siegel.
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Max Siegel is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law where he
is a staff editor and the rising Manuscripts Editor of the Maryland Law Review. He is thankful to
Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry for her brilliant mentorship, Lauren Genvert for her unyielding
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1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Mike Sacks, Lawsuits to Undo Key Parts of Health-Care Law Move Forward, So Far,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 29, 2010, at 8.
3. Id.
4. See id. (noting that state challenges to ACA hinge on the argument that Congress
exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause by forcing Americans to purchase health
insurance they may not want).
5. Polling suggests widespread support for repeal of ACA. See, e.g., Kaiser Health Tracking
FAMILY
FOUND.
(Nov.
9,
2010),
Poll–November
2010,
KAISER
http://www.kff.org//kaiserpolls/8120.cfm (finding that fifty-six percent of voters in the November
2010 midterm election favored repeal of ACA in total or in part).
6. See Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Public Opinion at the Time of the Vote on
Health Care Reform, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e55(1), e55(1), e55(6) (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1003844 (mining data from thirty-three independent
polls and finding that the majority of Americans have never been in support of the health care
reform law).
7. See, e.g., King on Obamacare: “It’s All Got to Go,” FOX NEWS (Jan. 17, 2011, 4:29 PM),
http://video.foxnews.com/v/4499519/king-on-obamacare-its-all-got-to-go (providing video of
statements by Representative Steve King (R-IA), describing health care reform as “a malignant
tumor that threatens to metastasize” and claiming that “it’s all got to go, pull it all out by the
roots”). But see Dan Joseph, Pelosi: Repealing Obamacare Would Do “Very Serious Violence to
the National Debt,” CNSNEWS.COM (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/pelosirepealing-obamacare-would-have-do (providing video of statements by Representative Nancy
Pelosi (D-CA), observing that her colleagues would cause “very serious violence to the national
debt and deficit” by repealing health care reform).
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Few political trends are as divisive as the changing role of government
in private health care coverage decisions. While many provisions of ACA
are popular, including the law’s intervention in private industry, ACA’s call
for individuals to purchase health insurance 8 remains a major cause of voter
hostility. 9 Now, more than twenty states have issued legal challenges to
ACA on the basis of its minimum essential coverage provision. 10 This
provision would impose a “penalty” in the form of a tax on individuals who
fail to purchase health insurance and who are not exempted in light of
certain exceptions. 11 Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli
successfully leveraged the minimum essential coverage provision in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to assert that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause12 by using a tax
on citizens to regulate beyond its constitutional powers.13 Virginia’s

8. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010) (setting out the individual responsibility
requirement), held unconstitutional by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
9. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll–November 2010, supra note 5 (finding that although the
majority of voters favored key provisions of ACA, such as financial subsidies that enable “low
and moderate income” citizens to purchase insurance and the prohibition against denial of
coverage based on preexisting conditions or medical history, voters widely disfavored the
individual mandate, with “two-thirds of the general public” supporting its repeal).
10. See Sacks, supra note 2 (explaining that the suit filed in federal district court in Florida by
the state’s attorney general challenging the minimum essential coverage provision of ACA has
been joined by nineteen other states, as well as the National Federation of Independent Business
and two individuals from Florida and Washington). Although other proceedings continue to move
forward, federal judges have upheld ACA on two occasions and dismissed twelve other cases on
procedural grounds. Karen Pallarito, Court Fight Over Health-Care Reform Shifts to Florida,
USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.healthscout.com/news/68/647579/main.html.
11. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2010), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011
WL 285683. The provision sets out that “[a]n applicable individual shall for each month
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.” Id.
§ 5000A(a). Exemptions are available for individuals who are unable to pay, who have religious
views that conflict with purchasing health insurance, who are incarcerated, and who enjoy Native
American tribal membership. Id. § 5000A(d)−(e).
12. The Constitution provides Congress with the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771–72, 781–82 (E.D. Va. 2010). States such
as Virginia have averred that all of ACA must be deemed invalid because the minimum essential
coverage provision is an essential and non-severable piece of the act. Complaint for Declaratory
& Injunctive Relief at 6, Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10CV188). According to the
district court in Sebelius, Virginia’s position relied in large part on the fact that Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius has repeatedly stated that the
minimum coverage requirement is a fundamental aspect of ACA. See Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at
789 (noting “the Secretary’s frequent contention that [the minimum coverage provision] is the
linchpin of the entire health care regimen underlying the ACA”). In his decision for the Northern
District of Florida in Bondi, Judge Roger Vinson found all of ACA unconstitutional because the
minimum essential coverage provision, which he held was an unconstitutional violation of the
Commerce Clause, is non-severable. See Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *39 (“I must conclude that
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winning assertion tracked closely with arguments from other states 14: If
Congress cannot tax a citizen’s choice to abstain from interstate
commerce, 15 and if a refusal to purchase health insurance constitutes
abstinence from interstate commerce, 16 then the minimum essential
coverage provision is unconstitutional. 17
Regardless of whether courts uphold ACA, the American debate
continues to be distracted by marketplace rhetoric.18 This preoccupation
with the business of health thwarts meaningful exploration of health
equity—a term this Comment employs as a proxy for the social
determinants of health.19 By challenging the process of health care
the individual mandate and the remaining provisions [of ACA] are all inextricably bound together
in purpose and must stand or fall as a single unit. The individual mandate cannot be severed.”).
14. See Pallarito, supra note 10 (noting that challengers across the country have made similar
arguments about the constitutionality of ACA’s minimum essential coverage provision).
15. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that “thus
far in our history, it has never been held that the Commerce Clause, even when aided by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, can be used to require citizens to buy goods or services”); see also
Memorandum of the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff’s Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10CV188) (“Finding
the mandate constitutional would be the first interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause or
the taxing power to permit the regulation of inactivity—in effect requiring an individual to engage
in an economic transaction.”). But see Brief Amici Curiae of the March of Dimes Foundation et
al. in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10CV188) (arguing
that taxing individuals who abstain from purchasing health insurance is a necessary and proper
means to address the substantial effect that insurers’ prohibition against covering individuals with
preexisting medical conditions has on interstate commerce).
16. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 13, at 1–2, 5 (arguing that
“[t]he status of being a citizen or resident” of Virginia triggers compliance with ACA’s individual
mandate but “arises from an absence of commerce, not from some sort of economic endeavor”).
A citizen’s refusal to purchase health insurance, however, might also be construed as strongly tied
to interstate commerce because the uninsured citizen is likely to one day require health services
and will then shift costs of services to other consumers. See Brief Amici Curiae of the March of
Dimes Foundation et al. in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that
uninsured individuals still utilize health care services and shift billions of dollars of costs to third
parties).
17. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 13, at 5–6 (suggesting that
“permit[ting] the national government to require the purchase of goods or services would deprive
the Commerce Clause of any effective limits . . . and would create powers indistinguishable from
a general police power in total derogation of our constitutional scheme of enumerated powers”);
see also Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771–72 (“The Commonwealth maintains that the failure, or
refusal, of its citizens to elect to purchase health insurance is not economic activity historically
subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.”).
18. See John P. Geyman, Myths as Barriers to Health Care Reform in the United States, 33
INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 315, 316 (2003) (claiming that during the five serious attempts to
universalize coverage in the United States over the last century, health care stakeholders have
persistently used “disinformation and obfuscation to confuse and mislead the public,” including
the American Medical Association repeatedly labeling national health insurance “‘socialized
medicine’” and the insurance industry raising fears of decreased options for choosing physicians).
19. Health equity is further distinguishable from public health, which relates to “the science
and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical health and efficiency
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financing and administration rather than focusing on more systemic forces
in society, current health care reform 20 ignores the most influential factors
in health, such as preexisting socioeconomic differentials and basic social
conditions. 21 In Part I, this Comment will extricate ACA’s regulatory
outcome from the politics surrounding it.22 Part I then will place the law
within the United States’s legal framework for addressing social
determinants of health 23 and will provide context for comparing health
systems in Europe and the United States.24 In Part II, this Comment will
scrutinize the depreciative impact of state challenges on the civic value of
the American debate. 25 Using the German health system as a point of
comparison, this Comment then will analyze ACA’s limited potential to
foster health equity26 before concluding that ACA will fall short as a
vehicle for enhanced solidarity in American health.27 Finally, to protect
citizens’ health, the country’s international reputation, and the integrity of
the democratic process,28 this Comment will urge policymakers to
implement incremental, multisectoral advancements toward better health in
the American body politic.29
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a foundation for understanding ACA’s effect in the
broader context of health equity. First, this Part sets out ACA’s underlying
regulatory philosophy: Health care can be improved by shifting

through organized community efforts.” C.E.A. Winslow, The Untilled Fields of Public Health, 51
SCIENCE 23, 30 (1920).
20. This Comment distinguishes health care reform from health reform on the basis of
whether legislative and policy fixes have a meaningful impact on the social determinants of
health. Later, this Comment will argue that ACA is a matter of health care reform because, at its
core, ACA is a cost-containment mechanism that does not adequately contribute to improved
health equity. See infra Part II.B.
21. Cf., e.g., Paula M. Lantz et al., Socioeconomic Factors, Health Behaviors, and Mortality:
Results from a Nationally Representative Prospective Study of US Adults, 279 JAMA 1703, 1707
(1998) (finding that the elimination of behavioral risk factors, as well as increased health
promotion and prevention efforts, would not be enough to curb the deleterious impact of
socioeconomic differentials on mortality); Bruce G. Link & Jo Phelan, Social Conditions As
Fundamental Causes of Disease, 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 80, 80 (1995) (arguing against a
myopic focus on the “proximal causes of disease” and in favor of paying “greater attention . . . to
basic social conditions” in an effort to optimize the positive impact of reform).
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part II.D.
29. See infra Part II.E.
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responsibility and transactional dynamics among consumers and their
business partners. 30 Second, this Part analyzes the preexisting legal
framework for actuating health equity in the United States.31 Finally, this
Part examines the basis for comparisons between health in the United States
and Europe and offers Germany as a prototype for the warring political
philosophies governing health in the Western world.32
A. Unpacking the Regulatory Philosophy Behind ACA
The most politicized aspects of the journey to health care reform have
often been the least indicative of the final law’s lasting impact.33
Controversies over hot button issues like abortion and the Stupak-Pitts
Amendment 34 are contrary to the statutory framework underlying the final
product of the reform efforts because restrictions on federal funding betray
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.C.
33. For example, ACA and an associated executive order set forward rules for abortion that
largely coincide with the Hyde Amendment, including rules prohibiting federal funding for
abortion and allowing states to forbid abortion coverage in health plans offered through stateoperated exchanges. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1303, 124 Stat. 119, 168–71 (2010); Exec. Order No. 13,535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 24,
2010) (establishing an enforcement mechanism to ensure that federal funds dispersed under ACA
are in accordance with the preexisting federal statutory restriction known as the Hyde
Amendment). The Hyde Amendment refers to a long-running legislative provision restricting
federal funding of abortion that has been attached to annual appropriations bill for the Department
of Health and Human Services since 1976. See, e.g., NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, PUBLIC FUNDING
FOR ABORTION: MEDICAID AND THE HYDE AMENDMENT 1 (2006), available at
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/public_funding.
pdf (explaining that in the three years between the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1976, Medicaid funds
covered abortion care without restriction); NAT’L COMM. FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT, THE
HYDE
AMENDMENT
1
(Apr.
2008),
available
at
http://www.nchla.org/datasource/ifactsheets/4FSHydeAm22a.08.pdf (observing that the Hyde
Amendment has taken various forms since 1976 and noting that the United States Supreme Court
affirmed its constitutionality in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325–27 (1980)). Under ACA,
states may choose to prohibit abortion coverage in health plans operating within state-operated
exchanges. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18023(a) (West 2010), held unconstitutional as not severable by
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011
WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
34. The Stupak-Pitts Amendment, offered to amend the House’s health care bill, the
Affordable Health Care for America Act of 2010, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009), sought to apply
the Hyde Amendment to the public option by prohibiting federal funding:
[T]o pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that
includes coverage of abortion, except in the case where a woman suffers from a
physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness that would, as certified by a
physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed,
including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself, or unless the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.
111 CONG. REC. H12921 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak).

2011]

DYING FOR DOLLARS

1091

the more gradual, externalized changes ACA stands to make. 35 This
Section describes health care reform’s overarching regulatory philosophy
by detailing the transformative economic role lawmakers intended ACA to
play in shaping the behavior of states, private insurers, and employers, 36 as
well as consumers of health services across the country. 37
1.

ACA Reforms Health Care by Changing the Business of
Accessing Services

ACA compels insurers and employers to cover a wider array of
individuals and conditions for less by restricting the ability of insurers and
employers to limit coverage or turn away potential consumers.38 In the
process, ACA taps states to provide oversight of private health insurance
coverage. 39
Increasingly, health insurance companies must cover more health
services for a larger variety of individuals. In September 2010, ACA began
prohibiting health insurers from offering policies that limit lifetime
benefits. 40 That same month, ACA forbade annual limits in policies
restricting benefits that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“the
Secretary”) deemed essential.41 In addition, health insurers could no longer

35. Cf. Jonathan Oberlander, A Vote for Health Care Reform, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e44(1),
e44(2) (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1002878 (emphasizing the
political risks involved in passing health care reform that is implemented slowly over a period of
four years).
36. See infra Part I.A.1.
37. See infra Part I.A.2.
38. See Christopher C. Jennings, Implementation and the Legacy of Health Care Reform, 362
ENG.
J.
MED.
e51(1),
e51(2)
(Apr.
15,
2010),
NEW
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1003709 (cataloguing ACA’s regulatory changes to
the insurance and small-business market, including its prohibition against rescissions and lifetime
ceilings on insurance payouts, its expansion of coverage to young adults under twenty-six, and its
provision of tax credits to small employers that provide employee coverage).
39. Cf. Sara Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the Health Reform Torch?, 362 NEW ENG. J.
MED. e29(1), e29(3) (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1001439
(describing how both the House and Senate health care reform bills balanced the need for
increased federal regulation in health care delivery against the understanding that meaningful
improvements required national efforts).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11(a)(1)(A) (West 2010) (prohibiting group health plans and health
insurance issuers from placing “lifetime limits on the dollar value of benefits for any participant or
beneficiary”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
41. Id. § 300gg-11(a)(2) (“With respect to plan years beginning prior to January 1, 2014, a
group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage may only establish a restricted annual limit on the dollar value of benefits for any
participant or beneficiary with respect to the scope of benefits that are essential health benefits . . .
as determined by the Secretary.”).
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rescind coverage once initiated,42 and going forward, all insurers must
cover uninsured individuals with preexisting conditions 43 and children
under the age of twenty-six. 44
Similar provisions represent how ACA limits employers’ ability to
turn away or disqualify individuals from coverage. Currently, ACA bars
sponsors of group health plans from generating plans that discriminate in
favor of employees who earn higher wages. 45 Likewise, in January 2014,
providers of group health insurance plans will face a prohibition against
exclusions due to preexisting conditions.46 ACA also supports the
establishment of a Small Business Health Options Program to assist small
businesses in covering their employees. 47
With ACA, Congress called upon the states to ensure that individuals
seeking coverage would be empowered both when purchasing health
insurance as individuals and when relying on their employers to facilitate
group coverage. Specifically, ACA tasks each state with establishing an
American Health Benefit Exchange—a governmental or nonprofit entity
that helps carry out ACA’s mandates. 48 By January 2014, states will
operate exchanges that facilitate the purchase of health plans, and these
exchanges must implement procedures to determine which health plans

42. Id. § 300gg-12 (prohibiting health insurance rescission except in instances of fraud or
intentional misrepresentation of material fact), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi,
2011 WL 285683.
43. Id. § 18001(d) (defining individuals eligible under the Act as citizens, nationals, or
individuals otherwise lawfully present in the United States who have not been covered in the
previous six months through the high risk pool and who have a preexisting condition), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
44. Id. § 300gg-14 (extending dependent coverage until the child turns 26), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
45. Id. § 300gg-16 (restricting discrimination in favor of highly compensated individuals for
group health plans other than self-insured plans), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi,
2011 WL 285683.
46. Id. § 300gg-3(a), (b) (prohibiting exclusion based on preexisting condition and defining
“preexisting condition exclusion” as “a limitation or exclusion of benefits relating to a condition
based on the fact that the condition was present before the date of enrollment for such coverage,
whether or not any medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or received
before such date”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
47. Id. § 18031(a), (b) (enabling the Secretary to make awards to states to establish an
American Health Benefit Exchange, which includes a Small Business Health Options Program
“that is designed to assist qualified employers in the State who are small employers in facilitating
the enrollment of their employees in qualified health plans offered in the small group market in
the State”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
48. See id. § 18031(b), (d) (calling for each state to establish an American Health Benefit
Exchange no later than January 1, 2014, to facilitate the purchase of health plans, assist employers
in fostering employee coverage, and generally make available qualified health plans to individuals
and employers).
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qualify under ACA. 49 States may even demand that health plans offer
benefits beyond the “essential health benefits package” required by the
Secretary to be deemed “qualified” and may require that any health plan
seeking certification submit a justification for premium increases.50 As a
result, Congress delegated considerable oversight of health insurance
companies to the states; because these oversight powers require states to
regulate private industry and simultaneously improve citizens’ access to
coverage, lawmakers have fostered a health care paradigm in which
consumers may look to external entities for support without limiting their
capacity for personal decision making. 51
2.

ACA Strives to Improve Health Through Risk Pooling and
Preparation

Beyond new federal and state regulations controlling access to health
care, 52 lawmakers expected ACA to change the function of citizens in the
American health care system. Congress anticipated that individuals would
contribute to healthier communities by purchasing insurance based on the
controversial minimum essential coverage provision, which seeks to enable
insurance coverage of those most in need of care by shifting costs to
healthier third parties in their communities. 53 Simultaneously, Congress
hoped that new funding and incentives would bolster prevention and
wellness programs in both the public and private sectors. 54

49. See id. § 18031(d) (describing minimum requirements for American Health Benefits
Exchanges, including “procedures for the certification, recertification, and decertification . . . of
health plans as qualified health plans,” as well as “operation of a toll-free telephone hotline to
respond to requests for assistance” and maintenance of “an Internet website through which
enrollees and prospective enrollees of qualified health plans may obtain standardized comparative
information on such plans”).
50. See id. § 18021(a) (defining qualified health plan), held unconstitutional as not severable
by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683; id. § 18022(a)–(b) (defining and setting forth the requirements of
essential health benefits package), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL
285683; id. § 18031(d)(3)(B), (e) (setting forth required and permissible actions by state
Exchanges).
51. See Jonathan Oberlander, Beyond Repeal—The Future of Health Care Reform, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2277, 2277−78 (2010) (discussing states’ oversight of ACA’s key provisions and the
risk that repeal poses to newly insured citizens).
52. See supra Part I.A.1.
53. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a) (asserting the congressional finding that, without essential
coverage requirements, many individuals would wait to purchase health care until completely
necessary and insurance providers would continue to engage in adverse selection), held
unconstitutional by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
54. See, e.g., id. § 280g-13(a)–(b) (empowering the Secretary to act through the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to enhance surveillance of congenital heart disease and identify
opportunities for educational outreach and prevention), held unconstitutional as not severable by
Bondi, 2011 WL 285683; id. § 280g-14(a) (calling for the creation of a national diabetes
prevention program), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683; id.
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State challenges to the minimum essential coverage provision
grounded in arguments that ACA unfairly deprives citizens of wealth belie
congressional intent because, like restrictions on employer or insurer costcontainment mechanisms, 55 the minimum essential coverage provision is
intended to empower individuals by shifting costs to third parties.
Lawmakers anticipated that the minimum essential coverage provision—
and various other provisions of ACA—would expand the health insurance
pool and ensure that more healthy individuals receive coverage. 56 The law
states that the minimum essential coverage provision “is essential to
creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of
pre-existing conditions can be sold.” 57 Accordingly, lawmakers decided to
balance new, more costly enrollees with cheaper, healthier enrollees in
order to help lower health insurance premiums and increase access to
care. 58 This provision has an immediate negative effect on the minority of
U.S. citizens who do not have health insurance because it penalizes their
refusal to purchase coverage; the provision has a beneficial effect, however,
on previously disqualified individuals who will come to rely on the
participation of those newly insured, healthier individuals in order to pool
risk and maintain access to care. 59

§ 280m(a) (designating the Secretary to conduct a national education campaign to increase public
awareness about breast health and cancer); id. § 300u-14(a) (authorizing grants to health
departments and Indian tribes to carry out community interventions, screenings, and clinical
referrals for individuals between the ages fifty-five and sixty-four), held unconstitutional as not
severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683; id. § 713(a)–(b) (authorizing the Secretary to provide
allotments to states, or three-year grants to local organizations and entities in nonparticipating
states, that implement evidence-based sexuality education programs), held unconstitutional as not
severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683; id. § 280l (setting out provisions to improve utilization of
wellness programs in the workplace).
55. See supra Part I.A.1.
56. See 42 U.S.C.A § 18091 (stating that the requirement to maintain essential coverage,
along with other provisions, “will add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market”
and that this requirement will encompass healthy individuals while expanding the insurance risk
pool).
57. Id.
58. See id. (explaining that the minimum essential coverage provision will add millions of
consumers to the insurance market while increasing the supply of and demand for health services,
increasing the number and share of insured Americans, and lowering health insurance premiums
by broadening the health insurance risk pool).
59. Comparison with Massachusetts’s “early experience with health care reform” provides
support for this conclusion. See generally Amitabh Chandra et al., The Importance of the
Individual Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293–95 (2011).
After its individual mandate took full effect, Massachusetts saw an increase in healthy enrollment
of “residents with incomes between 150 and 300% of the poverty level” despite the availability of
state insurance subsidies during the phase-in of the mandate; this increase evidenced a causal
connection between the Massachusetts mandate and improved risk selection. Id. The
Massachusetts example suggests that the mandatory coverage under ACA is likely to play an even
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ACA also works to improve health more directly by fostering
behavioral improvements and preventing disease. Under ACA, health plans
are likely to cover a variety of preventive services. 60 This renewed focus
on prevention extends to small business owners, who may be eligible for
grants to implement prevention-focused workplace wellness programs.61
ACA also requires increased governmental intervention focused on
improving public health, such as the development of a National Prevention
and Health Promotion Strategy that prioritizes ways to actuate lifestyle
behavioral modifications. 62 At the same time, potential health care
consumers will have new incentives to make better health care decisions.63
Enhanced disease prevention could reshape the impact of participants in the
health care system by decreasing the frequency of emergency medical
procedures and the incidence of costly lifestyle diseases. 64

more significant role in encouraging healthy enrollment because the subsidies available under
ACA are smaller than those available under the Massachusetts statute. Id. at 295.
60. For instance, ACA currently requires all new plans to cover preventive services and
immunizations recommended by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, as well as child preventive services and women’s preventive care
and screening recommended by the Health Resources and Services Administration. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-13(a), held unconstitutional as not severable by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
By September 30, 2013, the Secretary is required to report on the demonstrated potential of
community prevention and wellness programs to help Medicare beneficiaries make healthier
lifestyle choices and reduce their risk for disease, disability, and injury. Id. § 300u-14(b), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683. ACA also tasks the Secretary with
designating essential health benefits for insurance plans that include preventive and wellness
services and chronic disease management. Id. § 18022(a)–(b), held unconstitutional as not
severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683. Other essential services may include mental health and
substance abuse disorder services, hospitalization, emergency services, prescription drugs, and
pediatric services. Id.
61. Id. § 280l note, held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683. The
workplace wellness programs must be consistent with evidence-based standards, including the
Guide to Community Preventive Services and the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services. Id.
62. Id. § 300u-10 (calling for the President to establish a “National Prevention, Health
Promotion and Public Health Council” to coordinate prevention, wellness, and health promotion
efforts and the public health system, develop and subsequently report on a national strategy,
provide recommendations to the President and Congress, consider and propose transformative
models of prevention and health promotion, and carry out other activities as designated by the
President), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
63. For example, no later than January 1, 2019, the Secretary may establish an incentives
program for Medicare beneficiaries who utilize high quality physicians. Id. § 1395w-5(h), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
64. See, e.g., James F. Fries et al., Reducing Health Costs by Reducing the Need and Demand
for Medical Services, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321, 321 (1993) (suggesting expanded health
promotion and preventative care as ways of limiting health care costs in the United States). Socalled “lifestyle” diseases are “chronic, noncommunicable . . . diseases like cardiovascular disease
and diabetes.” Lindsay F. Wiley, Adaptation to the Health Consequences of Climate Change as a
Potential Influence on Public Health Law and Policy: From Preparedness to Resilience, 15
WIDENER L. REV. 483, 496 (2010); see also P. Zimmet, Globalization, Coco-Colonization, and
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Ultimately, ACA transforms health care by redistributing the financial
weight and reach of an individual’s health outcomes. Insurers and
employers will find it increasingly difficult to save money by avoiding
responsibility for the costs of those most in need of care, and vulnerable
populations will have more reasons to rely on their states to ensure
providers are operating within the regulations. 65 In the future, citizens will
stand to gain more than just their health by taking affirmative steps to
ensure their personal wellbeing, and promoting positive health outcomes
will be a matter of business strategy—for virtually everyone. 66
B. The State’s Idle Monopoly on Health Equity
Simultaneous to the political pursuit of improved health equity, the
judiciary has rejected individual attempts to assert affirmative rights, such
as a right to welfare, 67 while allotting broad deference to the states’
promotion of health. 68 This Section explores the absence of positive rights
in American jurisprudence and balances this absence against the tendency
of courts to subjugate individual liberty interests to governmental attempts
to contain medical costs and improve public health and safety.
1. No Right to Health Equity in American Constitutional Law
United States citizens do not have a constitutionally guaranteed right
to governmental assistance to meet their most basic needs. 69 Consequently,
state interventions that address social determinants of health are byproducts

the Chronic Disease Epidemic: Can the Doomsday Scenario Be Averted?, 247 J. INTERNAL MED.
301, 305 (2000) (listing cancer and heart disease as examples of “lifestyle” diseases).
65. See supra Part I.A.1.
66. Jonathan Gruber, The Cost Implications of Health Care Reform, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2050, 2051 (2010) (asserting that ACA wisely employs a rich variety of cost-control mechanisms
and represents an essential step toward improved financial efficiency and reduction of the federal
deficit).
67. See infra Part I.B.1.
68. See infra Part I.B.2.
69. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that rejected rights to welfare, housing, public
education, and medical services in the U.S. Constitution, see Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone’s
Bowl: A Call to Affirm a Positive Right to Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State
Constitutions to Satisfy International Standards of Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421, 426–
28 (2004) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980)); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989) (“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”).
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of the political process rather than constitutionally motivated judicial
intervention. 70
The Constitution limits and empowers government. Generally, the
Constitution does not create positive rights. 71 For example, in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 72 the Supreme Court of
the United States found that governmental obligations could arise from
political processes but not the Constitution. 73 The citizen only possesses
affirmative rights in limited contexts, such as state-imposed detention. 74 In
such instances, the government’s constitutional obligation to the individual
emanates “from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf” rather than “the State’s knowledge of the individual’s
predicament.” 75
The Supreme Court does not recognize an affirmative right to
welfare 76 despite cases like Shapiro v. Thompson, 77 in which the Court
noted that durational residential requirements for welfare benefits cut to the

70. But see Sarah C. Carey, A Constitutional Right to Health Care: An Unlikely Development,
23 CATH. U. L. REV. 492, 492 (1973) (examining the formation of a legislative system of health
care through state and federal legislation and applying constitutional guarantees within that
system); Doughten, supra note 69, at 426 (“The recent trend in cutting welfare benefits indicates
that the poor in the United States cannot rely on the democratic process to protect their interests.
In fact, the poor have been categorized as a ‘forgotten group’ who are virtually invisible in a
democratic system primarily driven by the desires of the wealthy.”).
71. See Jackson v. City of Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he
Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”); see also, e.g., Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 409–10 (1990) (discussing the ways in which the judiciary’s
refusal to impose affirmative duties on the state, such as the duty to protect against private
violence or the duty to assist women in receiving abortions, reinforces the general notion that the
Constitution only requires the government to refrain from certain actions).
72. 489 U.S. 189. The plaintiff in DeShaney had been repeatedly beaten by his father to the
point of lifelong mental impairment. Id. at 191, 193. The boy and his mother filed suit against the
county department of social services, alleging that the office had clear knowledge about the abuse
and did not act to remove the child. Id. at 192–93. The Supreme Court held that the State does
not have a constitutional obligation to protect citizens from private violence. See id. at 200, 203
(distinguishing a “State’s affirmative act of restraining [an] individual’s freedom to act on his own
behalf,” which triggers Due Process protections, from the State’s “failure to act to protect [an
individual’s] liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means”).
73. Id. at 195–96, 203.
74. Id. at 200.
75. Id. at 199–200.
76. See supra note 69.
77. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In
Shapiro, the Supreme Court considered three district court judgments separately holding laws in
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia that “denie[d] welfare assistance to
residents of the State or District who have not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one
year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance” unconstitutional. Id. at 621–27.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court decisions on the grounds that the statutes infringed
on welfare recipients’ constitutional right to travel. Id. at 629−31.
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core of “the ability . . . to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter,
and other necessities of life.” 78 Advocates for legal reform urged the Court
to construe decisions like Shapiro to create a fundamental interest in
welfare. 79 Despite these urgings, the Court has repeatedly rejected statemediated welfare as a constitutionally protected fundamental interest.80
The absence of constitutionally guaranteed welfare rights has garnered
significant attention on the national stage, but it has failed to produce
substantive change in the structure of the law in the United States.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s proposal of a “Second Bill of
Rights” was among the most notable historical moments in the struggle for
guaranteed access to welfare. 81 Importantly, “[t]he right to adequate
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health” took its
place in President Roosevelt’s proposal. 82 Yet, President Roosevelt sought
legislative action to embody his Second Bill of Rights83 and fell short of
promoting constitutional amendments or judicial enforcement that could
have transformed welfare rights in today’s legal system. 84

78. Id. at 627.
79. In 1977, Professor Tribe stated that no “recent decision provides a clear indication that the
Supreme Court regards basic governmental services as constitutional rights of individuals.”
Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Service, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1078–79 (1977). Yet, Professor
Tribe maintained that “the cases do not foreclose such an approach” either and was “convinced
that, despite its difficulties, a doctrine will ultimately emerge that recognizes under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments constitutional rights to decent levels of affirmative governmental
protection in meeting the basic human needs of physical survival and security, health and housing,
employment and education.” Id. at 1065–66, 1078–80; see also Frank I. Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 686 app. A (highlighting that the
Supreme Court “found it significant that the challenged requirement [in Shapiro] operated to
‘[deny] welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of families to obtain the very means to
subsist’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627)).
80. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 83−84 (1971) (finding constitutional a provision
of the Social Security Act that limited disability benefits based on receipt of workers’
compensation but not based on receipt of private insurance); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485–86 (1970) (holding that the Constitution only requires states to show a “reasonable
basis” for denying welfare services).
81. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 12–13 (2004) (noting that President Roosevelt
proposed his now famous Second Bill of Rights to urge Americans to find “‘a new basis of
security and prosperity . . . regardless of station, race, or creed’”).
82. Id. at 13 (articulating the components of President Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights).
83. See, e.g., id. at 15 (asserting that the G.I. Bill was among the most prominent legislative
fixes attributable to the Second Bill of Rights). The “G.I. Bill” refers to the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284, which provided educational and
vocational opportunities, as well as unemployment compensation, to World War II veterans.
84. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 14 (recalling Roosevelt’s assertion that “‘it is definitely
the responsibility of the Congress’” to execute the Second Bill of Rights).
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2. The State Has Broad Power to Regulate Health and Contain
Medical Costs
Without the constitutional or legal infrastructure necessary to support
citizens’ assertions of positive rights to welfare, 85 the State has justified
health laws as matters within its police power, often motivated by an
interest in cost-containment. 86 Concurrent with broad governmental acts to
promote health,87 courts have rejected citizens’ attempts to evade or compel
health laws. 88
The Supreme Court has long recognized an individual liberty interest
in being free from unwanted medical treatment, but states’ concerns have
often outweighed the interests of citizens. The Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Jacobson v. Massachusetts 89 demonstrated the liberal standard the
judiciary has applied when assessing the public health efforts of other
branches of the government.90 In Jacobson, the Court considered a
compulsory Massachusetts law that required state residents to pay a penalty
if they refused vaccination. 91 The Court attempted to “reconcil[e]
individual interests in bodily integrity with collective interests in health and
safety.” 92 This individual liberty interest, however, could not outweigh the
larger community’s right to defend itself against disease. 93 As a result, the
Jacobson Court analyzed the state’s encroachment on a liberty interest by

85. See supra Part I.B.1.
86. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (“The authority of the
state to enact [a mandatory vaccination] statute is to be referred to what is commonly called the
police power—a power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union
under the Constitution.”); see also State v. Solomon, 260 A.2d 377, 378–80 (Vt. 1969) (upholding
a state mandatory motorcycle helmet law as within the state’s police power and acknowledging
that “self-injury may be of such a nature to also invoke a general public concern”). This
dimension of American constitutional law is in sharp contrast with treatment of welfare in other
countries. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996 s. 27 (“Everyone has the right to have access to (a)
health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c)
social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants,
appropriate social assistance.”).
87. See James G. Hodge, Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government:
An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
93, 93−94 (1997) (observing that public health regulation has emanated from governmental
powers and become increasingly expansive throughout American history).
88. See notes 107−111 and accompanying text.
89. 197 U.S. 11.
90. See id. at 26 (“[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good.”).
91. Id. at 12.
92. Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil
Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 577 (2005); see also Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
93. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26–27.
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looking for a real or substantial link to public health or, alternatively, “a
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” 94 In the
end, the Court found that the statute was not in palpable conflict with the
Constitution and that the legislature, in mandating vaccination under threat
of criminal penalty, did not employ methods that lacked a real or substantial
relation to public health.95
Compulsory vaccination is just one of many examples illustrating the
government’s capacity to transform citizens’ lives. Judicial approval of
health laws conforms to the underlying policy interest of the United States
in remaining a safe, ordered society. 96 Later courts frequently employed
the Jacobson rationale 97 and further reinforced the doctrinal underpinnings
of the decision. 98 As the Court pointed out in Jacobson, an individual’s
personal wishes, finances, and physical safety are all forfeited the moment
the individual is drafted into the military. 99 Accordingly, as the Court
noted in Crowley v. Christensen, 100 individual liberty interests necessarily
bend to “such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing
authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order
and morals of the community.” 101
Despite the State’s established capacity to intervene in citizens’ health
choices, courts have frequently analyzed health laws in the context of costcontainment. For example, the State has often provided cost-containment
as a justification for compulsory helmet laws. 102 In accepting these
justifications, courts have repeatedly quoted an observation made by
Constitutional Law Professor Laurence Tribe: “In a society unwilling to
94. Id. at 31.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 29.
97. See James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer, Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public Health, and
the Legacy of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 571, 571 (2005) (discussing the
weight Jacobson carried in various challenges to vaccination laws and hundreds of other decisions
alluding to the state’s authority to constrain behavior).
98. See, e.g., New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885)
(suggesting that “the public health, the public morals, or the public safety” may rely on a police
power among the states). A state’s police power must yield, however, in case of conflict, to the
power invested in the federal government by the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 42 (1824).
99. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29.
100. 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
101. Id. at 89.
102. See Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1989) (construing Florida law)
(explaining that a motorcyclist who fails to wear a helmet is more likely to suffer serious injury,
costing the State more money in ambulance and police services, hospitalization costs, and public
assistance, than it might had the motorcyclist not failed to wear a helmet); Robotham v. State, 488
N.W.2d 533, 541 (Neb. 1992) (analyzing lawmakers’ intentions to contain costs through a
compulsory helmet law); Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757, 762 (Vt. 1994) (accepting financial
costs resulting from failure to wear a helmet as one basis for compulsory helmet laws).
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abandon bleeding bodies on the highway, the motorcyclist or driver who
endangers himself plainly imposes costs on others.”103 Courts have even
evoked health care reform to underscore the importance of compulsory
helmet laws as mechanisms for medical cost-containment. 104 This focus on
the economics of health is not necessarily the fault of the culture developed
by American health jurisprudence and could be due, in part, to poor
guidance from public health experts, who at times focus exclusively on
access to health services and behavioral change,105 as well as insufficient
data about the effectiveness of health interventions. 106
Citizens have also been unable to leverage potential liberty interests to
compel increased health regulation. Courts have found no fundamental
right to be free from non-naturally occurring radiation, 107 toxic
chemicals, 108 or tobacco in the air. 109 Further, individual challenges to
water fluoridation laws have failed to implicate fundamental rights to
bodily integrity and privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth

103. Picou, 874 F.2d at 1522 (alteration omitted) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-12, at 1371−72 (2d ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also, e.g., Benning, 641 A.2d at 762 (same).
104. According to the Supreme Court of Vermont in Benning:
This rationale is particularly apparent as the nation as a whole, and this state in
particular, debate reform of a health care system that has become too costly although
many do not have access to it. Whether in taxes or insurance rates, our costs are linked
to the actions of others and are driven up when others fail to take preventive steps that
would minimize health care consumption. We see no constitutional barrier to
legislation that requires preventive measures to minimize health care costs that are
inevitably imposed on society.
641 A.2d at 762.
105. See S. Leonard Syme et al., Incorporating Socioeconomic Factors into U.S. Health
Policy: Addressing the Barriers, 21 HEALTH AFF. 113, 114–15 (2002) (observing that public
health experts in the United States fail to act on socioeconomic determinants of health due to their
self-limiting organization around particular diseases).
106. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 247, 266−70
(2003) (charting the failure of the United States’s health system to practice evidence-based
medicine).
107. See Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d 421, 426–
27 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that freedom from non-naturally occurring radiation is a
fundamental right because such a right is not rooted in U.S. history or tradition).
108. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(dismissing plaintiffs’ argument for a constitutional right to be free from toxic chemicals because
the alleged right has never been recognized under the Fifth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments).
109. See Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting a constitutional argument for including the courts in tobacco cessation efforts).
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Amendments. 110 Simply, courts have told citizens that they cannot control
prophylactic measures taken by states to protect health and safety. 111
Health regulations have expanded with modern society, and
throughout this expansion the judiciary has repeatedly declared its profound
deference to other branches of government. 112 While the State may compel
individuals to improve their personal health and safety, citizens’ notions of
public welfare can never supersede the opinions of the State. 113 Thus,
courts have stripped citizens of their power to demand health from their
government as a matter of law in favor of total reliance on the political
process, which has focused on cost-containment rather than citizens’ most
basic needs. 114
C. Comparative Health Reform and the German Model
Comparisons between health programs in the United States and
models in Europe have served as rallying cries for political support.115
This Section establishes the boundaries of such comparisons based on the
theoretical foundations for health systems in European countries and the
United States, as well as the regulatory synthesis of community solidarity
and personal responsibility applied in both systems. 116 Grounds for

110. Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 29–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(concluding that there is no explicit or implicit constitutional right to water free from fluoridation).
111. See Quiles v. City of Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397, 398−400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that a citizen could not successfully challenge the prophylactic measures taken by a
municipality to prevent tooth decay).
112. See supra Part I.B.1.
113. See supra notes 86–111 and accompanying text. Although this Comment speaks to the
state’s monopoly on health and safety laws as a uniform condition, the American health paradigm
has a varying impact on different segments of the U.S. population. See, e.g., Vernellia R. Randall,
Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain’t Always Easy! An African
American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191, 191−93 (1996) (asserting
that slavery, segregation, and racism function as intervening variables in the normative application
of bioethical principles).
114. This preoccupation with finances carries over to potential avenues for reform, including
reform of the civil justice system. See generally, e.g., Dick Thornburgh, America’s Civil Justice
Dilemma: The Prospects for Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074, 1076 (1996) (arguing that monetary
interests rise to the forefront of any debate about reforming the legal system).
115. See, e.g., Michael Goldfarb, Where the Health Care Debate Seems Bizarre: Europeans
Live Longer, Shake Heads over US Attitudes Toward Universal Health Care, GLOBALPOST (July
21, 2009, 6:32 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/health/090721/comparing-healthcare-usgermany-france (arguing that opponents of health reform in the United States proliferated “lies,
damned lies” about health systems in Europe); Guillaume Vuillemey & Philip Stevens, Op-Ed.,
Obamacare Failed in Europe, WASH. EXAMINER (June 30, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/2009/06/obamacare-failed-europe (leveraging the health
systems in Britain and France to assert that President Obama’s plan for a public option would
worsen financial and quality control problems in the United States).
116. See infra Part I.C.1.
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comparison are especially strong in Germany, where incentive 117 programs
are increasingly used to actuate shared regulatory principles that reflect a
global shift toward the use of business strategies to improve health.118
1. Understanding the German Comparison
American and European health outcomes are driven by different
theories but similar political dualities. The principles shared between
American and European health systems provide a limited basis for
comparison. 119 In particular, Germany is a prototype for the liberal and
conservative political duality galvanizing Western health because the
German health system combines leftist notions of solidarity with a
conservative emphasis on personal responsibility. 120
While grounds for comparison exist, Western health systems are far
from identical. On the surface, European systems emerge from a different
theoretical framework than systems in the United States.121 European
scholars call for a triad of “Responsibility, Solidarity and Subsidiarity” in
health and view solidarity in particular as “deeply rooted in European
culture and supported by secular . . . and Christian ethical positions.”122
Yet, in both the United States and Europe, health care represents an
amalgamation of leftist ideology, which attributes poor health to the
environment and living conditions, combined with the ideology of the right,
which focuses on individual behaviors and the link between entitlements
and personal responsibility. 123 Accordingly, the political divide in the

117. This Comment employs the terms bonus and incentives interchangeably and adopts the
narrow definition of an incentive as “a material or idealistic benefit conditional on certain
voluntary health related behaviour.” Harald Schmidt et al., What Can We Learn from German
Health Incentive Schemes?, 339 BRIT. MED. J. 725, 727 (2009).
118. See infra Part I.C.2.
119. See Peter T. Sawicki, Communal Responsibility for Health Care—The Example of Benefit
Assessment in Germany, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e42(1), e42(2)–(3) (Nov. 12, 2009),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0908797 (remarking that Germany’s prioritization
of individuals’ health and rights over government costs is a reaction to the Third Reich’s abuse of
the concept of “public health,” but nonetheless suggesting the advantages a more communitybased approach might offer in the United States).
120. See id. at e41(1) (observing that while the German health system’s emphasis on solidarity
may seem socialist, a conservative German political figure first introduced the model more than a
century ago).
121. See id. (explaining that many Germans are bewildered by debate over health care in the
United States because most European people recognize strong community as the driving force for
a successful health system and a prosperous society).
122. Hans-Martin Sass, The New Triad: Responsibility, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, 20 J. MED.
& PHIL. 587, 587 (1995).
123. See Harald Schmidt, Health Responsibility, the Left, and the Right, BIOETHICS F. (July 6,
2007),
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American health debate reflects disparate philosophies across the world,
and tapping European systems is an appropriate method for analyzing the
potential impact of Americans’ contentious political ideologies on their
country’s health care. 124
Germany’s health system is ripe for a transatlantic comparison125
because Germany’s public health philosophy is a paradigmatic hybrid of
personal responsibility and community solidarity. Article I of Book V of
the German Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch—SGB) 126 is titled
“solidarity and responsibility.” 127 Article I states that the purpose of
statutory health insurance is to enhance the health of the individual while
recognizing that insured citizens share responsibility for their health.128
Germany expects its citizens to take responsibility for their health through
“a health conscious lifestyle, through early involvement in health care
measures, and through active participation in treatment or rehabilitation to
help with the onset of illness and disability.” 129 Accordingly, Germany’s
statutory health insurance attributes health outcomes to both the individual
and “a caring society.” 130
Germany’s belief in shared responsibility is not without limits. In
explicit statutory language, Germany discourages overutilization and abuse
of health services. 131 Article II of Book V speaks to “necessity, cost
effectiveness, and personal responsibility.” 132 Here, German insurers are
told to provide coverage “with due respect to cost-effectiveness.”133
Coverage extends “insofar as the need for services is not attributable to the
personal responsibility of the insured,” and the insured must guarantee costeffectiveness while seeking services “insofar as necessary.” 134 Thus, while
Germany designed its statutory insurance system to improve health
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=440 (detailing the ramifications of
the polarizing discourse about personal responsibility in health emanating from both the political
right and the political left).
124. See infra Part II.C.
125. See infra Part II.B−C.
126. Book V of the German Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch—SGB) regulates the provision of
statutory health care by German sickness funds, which provide care to approximately ninety
percent of the German population. Harald Schmidt, Bonuses as Incentives and Rewards for
Health Responsibility: A Good Thing?, 33 J. MED. & PHIL. 198, 200 (2008).
127. Sozialgesetzbuch V Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung [SGB] [SOCIAL CODE], art. I (Ger.)
[hereinafter German Social Code, Book V].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Schmidt, supra note 126, at 200–01 (discussing and translating Article II, Book V of the
German Social Code).
132. Id. at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 200–01.
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outcomes in light of community and personal autonomy, governmental
support does not extend to especially irresponsible Germans. 135
2. Health Incentives That Eliminate Costs but Not Inequality
Germany has balanced the health needs of diverse populations and the
economic demands of quality care through innovative strategies to improve
public health, including incentive programs aimed at modifying individual
behavior. 136 Similar programs in the United States have been generally
successful at promoting economic efficiency, but private market
mechanisms such as incentive programs have not solved the problem of
unequal access to health care across socioeconomic classes.137
Germany’s focus on fostering community health has not been without
attention to the financial bottom line. Providers in the German health
system are particularly concerned with innovations that contain costs
because they are legally obliged to use savings in their own programs to pay
for bonuses and administrative overhead.138 Thus, in 1994, Germany
opened its insurance market to private providers with the hope of increasing
overall efficiency. 139 Providers throughout Germany have increasingly
adopted market mechanisms to stay competitive. 140 Since 2004, insurance
providers have offered a range of bonuses for different health behaviors.141
These bonuses are natural extensions of the German health system’s
emphasis on personal responsibility and are a response to the growing
incidence and prevalence of lifestyle diseases. 142 Now, virtually every
major insurer in Germany offers bonus systems to improve health outcomes
and reduce overall costs. 143

135. For example, coverage does not extend to Germans when they engage in unnecessary
bodily modifications, and amendments made in 2007 amplified Article 52, Book V of the German
Social Code, which sets out conditions under which statutory sickness funds may limit covered
services. Id. at 201. Under the 2007 amendments, insurers may ask for equivalent contributions
for complications arising from “cosmetic surgery, tattoos[,] . . . piercings, or another nonmedically indicated measures.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See Schmidt et al., supra note 117, at 725–28 (explaining that Germany has used various
incentive schemes to improve population health, efficiency, and competition).
137. See Harald Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform—Problems with
Wellness Incentives, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e3(1), e3(1) (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0911552 (cautioning against giving incentives an
ethical free pass and warning that incentives pose a risk of inequity by further disadvantaging
vulnerable populations).
138. German Social Code, Book V, supra note 127, § LXVa(3).
139. Schmidt, supra note 126, at 199.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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These incentive programs have attained cost savings by attracting and
retaining clients in similar ways to airlines or supermarkets that use loyalty
schemes. 144 German insurance providers may offer “bonuses,” including
cash, reductions in insurance contributions, and in-kind benefits for
participation in health promotion, screening, and medical checkups. 145 For
instance, individuals who participate in counseling sessions for cervical,
bowel, and breast cancer and then do not refuse treatment can halve
applicable co-payments. 146 Germany’s sickness funds offer participants
bonus points for engaging in various medical activities, such as
immunizations and checkups for chronic diseases. 147 Participants who
redeem points may be eligible for in-kind bonuses like access to personal
Internet-based electronic health records, backpacks, cycle helmets,
kitchenware, sports watches, and partial funding of a short wellness
holiday. 148 Conducting a preliminary evaluation, researchers found that
incentives resulted in considerable savings, further supporting the staying
power of these programs in the German health market. 149
While financially successful, efforts to save have not benefited every
German citizen. Bonuses have curbed overall health care costs,150 and
providers in various countries have shown interest in using incentive
programs. 151 Yet, curbing costly chronic illnesses demands a more
multifaceted approach.152 For example, wealthier socioeconomic classes
may have better access to workout facilities than poorer groups, which
comparatively enhances the likelihood that wealthier citizens will meet
targets for incentives such as healthier body mass indexes or lower

144. Id. at 198−99, 208–12.
145. Id. at 208–09 (discussing Section 65a, Book V of the German Social Code).
146. Id.
147. Stephanie Stock et al., Preliminary Analysis of Short Term Financial Implications of a
Prevention Bonus Program: First Results from the German Statutory Health Insurance, 53 INT’L
J. PUB. HEALTH 78, 80 tbl.1 (2008).
148. Id. at 79; see also Schmidt, supra note 126, at 208.
149. Stock et al., supra note 147, at 83.
150. Id. at 78 (presenting data that suggests participation in health bonus plans decreased
costs).
151. See KAREN JOCHELSON, KING’S FUND, PAYING THE PATIENT: IMPROVING HEALTH
USING
FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES
3
(Dec.
2007),
available
at
http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/BCC2F5C3-B685-4FF1-AE7739C52F4ED247/0/payingthepatient.pdf (describing health interventions in England, South Africa,
Latin America, and the Caribbean that utilize financial incentives).
152. COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., CLOSING THE
GAP IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH
1
(2008),
available
at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf.
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cholesterol. 153 Accordingly, participation in German incentive programs
among the top socioeconomic quintile has been nearly double the
participation among those in the lowest socioeconomic quintile.154
Moreover, incentives pose varying degrees of value to different segments of
the population. 155 If the German health system were able to eliminate
barriers to equal utilization across socioeconomic strata, incentives may be
so disproportionately advantageous to poorer individuals that participation
in incentive programs could become unduly coercive or even
involuntary. 156 Consequently, while incentives save money by encouraging
the wealthier class to improve their lives, they intensify the consequences of
poor health among less affluent citizens.157
In many respects, the history of German health care represents an
inverse of the shift away from absolute private control toward greater public
regulation in the United States because the German health system was once
universally public and has become increasingly privatized. 158 Both systems
will move forward as a blend of strong public regulation and private sector
cost-containment mechanisms, with the United States uniquely poised to
learn from Germany and, in particular, from the fate of its mutually
supportive community model at the hands of market necessity. 159
II. ANALYSIS
While ACA’s historical and international framework will not delimit
its trajectory in American courts, this background denotes the law’s limited
capacity to improve American health. This Part argues that state challenges
to ACA stall progress in the debate in the United States on health reform. 160
This Part then examines the equalizing effect ACA may have on the lives of
citizens and concludes that more sweeping initiatives are necessary to

153. See Schmidt et al., supra note 137, at e3(1) (explaining that targets for incentives such as
achievement of a specific body mass index or cholesterol level are designed around the
assumption that anyone “can achieve these targets if they try”).
154. Id. at e3(2).
155. See id. at e3(3) (arguing that incentive schemes become problematic when those unable to
reach targets are most in need of an award).
156. See id. (“Proponents emphasize that wellness incentives are voluntary. But . . .
voluntariness can become dubious for lower-income employees, if the only way to obtain
affordable insurance is to meet the targets.”).
157. In addition, incentives may impair the provision of health care regardless of patients’
socioeconomic contexts. See id. (observing that German health officials rejected statutory
incentive schemes on the grounds that these schemes would compromise their therapeutic
relationships by forcing them to police their patients).
158. See supra Part I.C.1.
159. See infra Part II.B−C.
160. See infra Part II.A.
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address the social determinants of health. 161 Next, this Part explores
ACA’s limited potential to spark progress in American health principles162
and asserts that prolonging the American status quo compromises the
country’s wellbeing, international standing, and democratic process.163
Finally, this Part recommends practical solutions for cultivating better
health equity in the United States.164
A. State Challenges Detract from Meaningful Discourse About Health
Challenges to ACA push dialogue about health away from health
equity and toward a faceless investigation into what constitutes interstate
commerce. 165 These challenges denigrate individual health outcomes and
have a depreciative impact on the civic value of the American debate
because they focus exclusively on the power of government to finance a
new health care system. 166
Current state challenges to ACA wrongly emphasize the power of
government instead of focusing on the need for sweeping changes in
citizens’ lives. As in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 167 a court that hears a
challenge to ACA must consider the government’s capacity to impose a
penalty tax on citizens who refuse to participate in health care.168 But
unlike Jacobson, in which the claimant implicated a personal liberty interest
because involuntary vaccination would violate his bodily integrity,169
challenges to health care reform hinge on the minimum essential coverage
provision and on whether government has the power to penalize abstinence
from interstate commerce. 170 Regardless of the outcome of these

161. See infra Part II.B.
162. See infra Part II.C.
163. See infra Part II.D.
164. See infra Part II.E.
165. See Sara Rosenbaum, A “Broader Regulatory Scheme”—The Constitutionality of Health
Care Reform, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1881, 1881−82 (2010) (dissecting legal challenges to ACA
and analyzing their reliance on the Commerce Clause).
166. See Oberlander, supra note 51, at 2278 (observing that “[d]ivisions [about ACA] reflect
ideological and partisan disagreements over the appropriate scope of government and markets”).
167. 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (examining Massachusetts’s power to impose a monetary penalty
on a citizen who refused vaccination).
168. See Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 770–71 (E.D. Va. 2010) (considering
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to tax citizens who do not purchase health
insurance).
169. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25–26.
170. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
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challenges, they temporarily neutralize the more sweeping reforms
necessary to remedy the driving forces behind poor health outcomes. 171
The federal government’s power to override citizens’ personal health
decisions is already clear. The Constitution vests power to promote health
and safety in every level of government, 172 and the State’s monopoly on
health regulation forces citizens to rely on governmental initiatives such as
the minimum essential coverage provision to foster health equity. 173
Citizens do not have a constitutionally protected positive right to
welfare, 174 but courts understand the vital impact of citizens’ welfare on the
State. 175 The government can impose penalties on individuals who avoid
vaccination because, in an ordered society, the rights of the few cannot
subordinate the common welfare.176 Similarly, the government can
regulate nutrition labeling, 177 the decision whether to wear a helmet, 178 and
the chemicals in drinking water. 179 Moreover, the charge of the
government to preserve public health implicates more than the community’s
right to defend against diseases 180 and includes the right to call upon
citizens to sacrifice themselves in war.181 The State has a long history of
leveraging public health and safety to subordinate individual rights in a way
that is akin to the economic liberties implicated by the essential minimum
coverage provision. 182 Consequently, challengers’ framing of the debate
echoes the ultimately redundant abortion controversy that erupted during
the passage of health care reform; those currently challenging the law fail to
171. See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 1
(opining that “urgent and sustained” action is required at multiple levels of government to address
inequities in power and economic distribution that degrade health equity).
172. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 6 (2000)
(“The constitutional design reveals a plain intent to vest power in government, at every level, to
protect community health and safety.”)
173. See supra Part I.B.
174. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis
organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy.”)
176. Id. at 28–29 (observing that the safety of the general public may require restraints on
individual rights).
177. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require nutrition labeling).
178. See, e.g., Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757, 758 (Vt. 1994).
179. See, e.g., Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 29–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005);
Quiles v. City of Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397, 398-400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
180. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (noting the state’s power to pass laws preserving sanitation,
life, liberty, health, and property “within its limits”).
181. See id. at 29 (observing that despite the liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment, individuals can be compelled by force to die in the country’s defense).
182. See supra Part I.B.2.
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understand that the final product in the push for reform stands to make more
gradual, externalized changes to health care. 183 Notwithstanding the
judiciary’s final decision on ACA, the current challenges stand, at most, to
contribute to the rewriting of history rather than debate the future of laws
that have far-reaching consequences in virtually every aspect of life. 184
B. ACA Is a Cost-Containment Measure When Americans Need Health
Reform
ACA does not signify the sweeping change in American health policy
that is necessary to meaningfully address social determinants of health.
ACA’s underlying regulatory philosophy of improving health by changing
health care costs could redefine the connection between health outcomes
and employers and insurers, as well as the individuals to whom the health
outcomes most directly belong. 185 Improving access to health services is
an important step toward better health equity because it facilitates more
universal coverage, but ACA falls short as a matter of true health reform. 186
New regulation of employers and insurance companies and enhanced
state oversight will force private entities to absorb the costs of individuals’
poor health. ACA stands to drastically increase the number of insured in
the United States. 187 To accomplish this goal, ACA pits private insurers
against public entities, such as the states’ American Health Benefit
Exchanges, 188 because state and federal governments and nonprofits will
183. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
184. Congressional attempts to kill ACA have been similarly shortsighted. See Joseph R.
Antos, Reforming Health Care Reform in the 112th Congress, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2011)
(suggesting that while the House might successfully repeal ACA, a repeal bill will not pass the
Senate, and arguing, additionally, that the Senate is likely to reject any language intended to stifle
implementation of the law in a continuing resolution). Antos’s first argument proved to be
correct. See Mark Arsenault, Congress Gears Up for Elections with Flurry of Votes, BOS. GLOBE,
May 6, 2011, at 2 (“Almost immediately after taking power in January, House Republicans passed
legislation to repeal Obama’s health care overhaul. . . . The Senate, as expected, quickly squashed
the measure.”).
185. See supra Part I.A.
186. See Bruce Siegel & Lea Nolan, Leveling the Field—Ensuring Equity Through National
Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2401, 2401 (2009) (commenting that proposals to
expand coverage would not be an entire solution to the health care problem and arguing that
reform “[w]ithout an explicit focus on equity . . . [would] leave millions of Americans behind”).
187. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the number of uninsured residents will drop
by thirty-two million as a result of health care reform. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir.,
Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives and Attachments
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf.
188. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(a)–(b), (d) (West 2010) (enabling the Secretary to make grants for
the creation of American Health Benefit Exchanges, which are governmental agencies or
nonprofit entities that make available qualified health plans to citizens), held unconstitutional as
not severable by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
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control premium rates and essential coverage.189 This new tension between
the public and private sectors extends to employers as well, who will face
broader coverage requirements for their employees. 190 Because an
individual’s health status cannot be a qualifier for coverage, 191 and because
insurers can no longer engage in price gouging 192 or employers in salarybased coverage, 193 this new system transforms health into a business goal
by resituating optimal financial gains behind improved health.
Thus, to keep their beneficiaries out of long-term care and to save
money, private entities might contribute to prevention efforts emerging
simultaneously from local and federal governmental entities, nonprofits,
employers, and health insurers. ACA signals a step forward in the
government’s willingness to promote public health through preventive
measures, 194 some of which private insurers will be required to cover.195
Further, insurers could encourage employers to promote health among
employees because employers are important gatekeepers to a large number
of beneficiaries in the context of fixed premiums 196 and more universal
coverage requirements.197
Employers and private insurers in the United States might also rely on
incentive programs to promote their beneficiaries’ health. As in Germany,
189. Id. § 18031(d)(3), (e)(2) (empowering state-operated exchanges to require benefits
beyond the essential health benefits designated by the Secretary).
190. See id. § 300gg-16 (prohibiting the limiting of coverage based on employees’ salaries and
the consideration of premium rates when determining whether to offer health plans), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
191. Id. § 18001 (establishing a system for “[i]mmediate access to insurance for uninsured
individuals with a preexisting condition”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011
WL 285683.
192. See id. § 18031(e)(2) (requiring insurers to submit justifications for any premium increase
before implementation).
193. See supra note 190.
194. See supra Part I.A.2.
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (requiring group and individual insurers to cover at a minimum
evidence-based items or services recommended by the United States Preventive Services Task
Force, immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Health Resources and Services
Administration’s recommended preventive care and screenings for children, youth, and women),
held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
196. Id. § 18031(e)(2) (requiring health plans to justify premium increases before
implementation).
197. See, e.g., id. § 300gg-3 (prohibiting exclusions based on preexisting condition “or other
discrimination based on health status”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL
285683; id. § 300gg-11 (prohibiting “lifetime limits” or “annual limits on the dollar value of
benefits for any participant or beneficiary”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011
WL 285683; id. § 300gg-14 (extending “dependant coverage of children . . . until the child turns
26 years of age”), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683; id. § 300gg16 (prohibiting “discrimination in favor of highly compensated individuals”), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
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incentive programs stand to improve the overall cost efficiency of the
American health system. 198 Likewise, incentive programs could alleviate
some of the financial burden endemic to covering treatment for lifestyle
diseases. 199 In addition, when insurance providers uniformly offer all
essential benefits at a fixed premium, 200 these providers need incentive
programs to attract enrollees and distinguish themselves from their
competitors. 201
Incentive programs and broader coverage could spark a new legacy of
improved access and contribute to better health equity. Fixed bonuses, such
as those made in-kind using predetermined catalogues of goods or resulting
in set dollar amounts, 202 are likely to provide more convincing incentives to
seek out health care in poorer communities, which are less likely to be
saturated with the latest goods and financial benefits being proffered as
incentives than wealthier communities. 203 At the same time, providers
could find new monetary motivations to engage underserved communities
because poorer individuals will be more likely to possess coverage than in
the past, and, at least within the first few years of ACA’s implementation,
poorer communities will need more serious medical care due, in large part,
to current health inequity in the United States. 204 Thus, even if reform will
not benefit everyone equally, ACA harnesses the private sector to foster
improved health equity by giving insurance providers and health care
professionals new reasons to reach out to underserved populations. 205

198. See, e.g., Stock et al., supra note 147, at 81–83 (finding that individuals enrolled in bonus
schemes are more likely to enjoy health care savings than individuals who are not enrolled in such
schemes).
199. See id. at 83 (finding that in the context of medications, hospitals, and additional
treatment for individuals seventy-five years and older, “a sickness fund prevention-based program
could result in a decrease in health care costs”).
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)–(e) (requiring plans within governmental or nonprofit exchanges
to provide certain essential benefits and to provide justification for premium increases before
implementation).
201. See Schmidt et al., supra note 117, at 725 (offering enhanced competition between
sickness funds as a rationale for incentive systems in Germany and explaining that these programs
attract and retain clients in ways similar to traditional loyalty schemes).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 145–149.
203. See Schmidt et al., supra note 137, at e3(2)–(3) (reviewing the disproportionate value of
health attainment bonuses between different segments of the population).
204. See generally N.H. Antia, Health Economics or the Economics of Health?, 3 J. HEALTH
MGMT. 159 (2001) (detailing the continuation of health disparities among the American poor).
205. See Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate—An Affordable and
Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 6 (2009) (asserting
that required coverage would eliminate adverse selection and thus dispose of “such policies as
exclusion periods for coverage of preexisting conditions, benefit riders that permanently exclude
particular types of care, higher premium rates or cost-sharing requirements for people with health
problems, and outright denials of coverage”).
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Yet, incentives and coverage will have a limited reach. Like in
Germany, private industry intervention to improve health outcomes is likely
to disproportionately benefit wealthier classes, and subjectively valued
incentives might even burden poorer communities. 206 Moreover, these
programs will be even less advantageous in the United States because ACA
will not result in coverage for everyone207 and because insurance providers
will have little reason to offer incentives to uninsured populations who will
not immediately contribute to health care costs. Providers could also
experience “social loafing” 208 and could resist engaging in prevention
initiatives due to the diffusion of responsibility for consumers’ health
created by ACA; because many other entities—employers, nonprofits, and
governmental actors—will be newly enlivened to promote health, providers
could deny their own responsibility to consumers’ health. 209 Similarly,
curbing the incidence and prevalence of chronic illnesses requires special
attention to environmental contributors to poor health 210 that insurance
providers are unlikely to meaningfully address. These limitations reflect
the pivotal flaw in ACA’s design: Unaccompanied private market
intervention will not holistically reform health in the United States. 211
C. ACA Contributes to Limited Improvements in American Health
Principles
Financial efficiency is the inherent goal of any cost-containment
mechanism. 212 ACA may contribute to the appearance of enhanced

206. See supra Part I.C.2.
207. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that twenty-three million individuals,
including undocumented citizens, will remain without coverage under ACA. See Letter from
Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 187.
208. Social loafing refers to the phenomenon of individuals exerting less effort when they
work in a group than when they work individually. See generally Steven J. Karau & Kipling D.
Williams, Social Loafing: A Meta-Analytic Review and Theoretical Integration, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681 (1993) (defining social loafing and describing it as a robust
phenomenon across different populations and tasks).
209. See supra Part I.A.2.
210. COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 1 (“The poor
health of the poor, the social gradient in health within countries, and the marked health inequities
between countries are caused by the unequal distribution of power, income, goods, and services,
globally and nationally . . . .”).
211. ACA’s preoccupation with the private market is also the crux of state challenges to the
law. See Wendy K. Mariner et al., Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli? And Why That’s a
Hard Question, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 202 (2011) (attributing the constitutional controversy
surrounding ACA to conservative legislators’ insistence that reform preserve the private insurance
industry because broadening access while preserving private industry control necessitates the
minimum essential coverage provision).
212. But see Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2477,
2477–81 (2010) (arguing to expand the use of the term “value,” defined as “health outcomes
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solidarity by redistributing the consequences of personal health to third
parties, but it still mistakenly rests on the principle of personal
responsibility to transform individual lives. 213
Current health care reform could signify an important redistribution of
American values because the law does not directly inspire personal
initiatives to improve health. The newly diffused economic consequences
of health outcomes may give the European principle of solidarity new roots
in the United States—at least to the extent employers and insurers will have
profound financial interests in protecting individuals’ health—but the
emerging American system lacks the statutory framework cautioning
citizens against overutilization of health care that exists in Germany. 214
Unlike the German system, the limits on beneficiaries’ health coverage will
not be delineated until the Secretary designates essential benefits,215 and
even then, essential benefits will be subject to state-initiated expansions.216
The minimum essential coverage provision is one source of personal
responsibility in ACA, but even assuming it survives its judicial challenges,
the provision is likely to face congressional erosion in light of its wellestablished unpopularity. 217 Regardless, the minimum essential coverage
provision is less likely to contribute to personal responsibility in the long
term anymore than the current insurance system because coverage
rescission, 218 as well as annual and lifetime caps on essential coverage, will

achieved per dollar spent,” beyond financial concerns to include patient-centered health care
accountability measures).
213. See David R. Williams et al., Beyond the Affordable Care Act: Achieving Real
Improvements in Americans’ Health, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1481, 1481 (2010) (asserting that ACA will
reduce the proportion of uninsured people and improve access to health care, but explaining that
creating a healthy nation will also “require individuals to accept responsibility for their own health
and to make healthy choices”).
214. Schmidt, supra note 126, at 200–01 (discussing and translating Section II, Book V of the
German Social Code on “necessity, cost-effectiveness, and personal responsibility” and requiring
insurers to provide coverage “with due respect to cost effectiveness” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
215. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West 2010), held unconstitutional as not severable by Florida ex
rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
216. Id. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i) (explaining that exchanges can require insurers to offer benefits in
addition to federally-mandated essential benefits), held unconstitutional as not severable by
Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
217. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll–November 2010, supra note 5 (finding that two-thirds of
voters in the November 2010 midterm election favored repeal of the minimum essential coverage
provision).
218. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-12 (prohibiting rescission of existing coverage unless an enrollee
has engaged in fraud or made “an intentional misrepresentation of material fact” prohibited by the
terms of the coverage), held unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
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be prohibited. 219 In general, citizens will be less at risk for serious
financial loss as a result of falling ill than ever before and the efforts of
private, nonprofit, and governmental actors will be the force defining the
future of personal responsibility as a guiding principle in the new American
health system. 220
Shifting the monetary consequences of poor health cannot erase the
American health system’s legacy of unequal access to services, nor will
ACA transform the country’s tradition of saving money at the cost of
community wellbeing. The more highly privatized roots of the American
system are likely to reinforce providers’ prioritization of competitiveness
over population health, and providers will be less likely to share best
practices or focus utilization on approaches that produce better health
outcomes at a higher expense. 221 Further, ACA cannot remove all
preexisting systemic barriers to better health in poorer communities,
including limited access to nutritious foods 222 and racially imbalanced
health care institutions.223 Clearly, the multifaceted approach necessary to
address all contributors to illness in the United States would require
legislation that is far more comprehensive than ACA.224
Better access to care could enhance disease prevention and contribute
to improved personal responsibility among communities most at risk for
illness, but detrimental daily living conditions outside the individual’s
control are unlikely to improve. Preexisting health disparities,225 along

219. Id. § 300gg-11 (prohibiting the establishment of lifetime or annual limits), held
unconstitutional as not severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
220. See supra Part I.A.1.
221. See Schmidt et al., supra note 117, at 728 (noting that incentive programs can be
counterproductive to population health by making insurance providers less likely to share
experiences or use cash incentives, which are more effective than in-kind incentives but provide
less financial return).
222. See Kameshwari Pothukuchi, Community Food Assessment: A First Step in Planning for
Community Food Security, 23 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 356, 360 (2004) (exploring the
multidisciplinary approach needed to improve community nutrition).
223. See Susan J. Shaw, The Logic of Identity and Resemblance in Culturally Appropriate
Health Care, 14 HEALTH 523, 523 (2010) (observing that improved diversity in the health care
workforce is commonly identified as a means for addressing health disparities between minority
and majority populations in the United States and examining the complicated impact of
resemblance programs in the United States).
224. See Kevin Fiscella, Health Care Reform and Equity: Promise, Pitfalls, and Prescriptions,
9 ANNALS FAM. MED. 78, 83 (2011) (concluding that legislation in addition to ACA is necessary
to address access for the remaining twenty-three million uninsured individuals in the United
States); Elaine C. Jones & Michael Amery, Health Care Reform: What It May Mean for Your
Practice, 75 NEUROLOGY S52, S54 (Supplement 1) (2010) (observing that ACA does little to
reform the consequences of malpractice or flawed funding formularies).
225. See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 1
(proclaiming that “[h]ealth equity is an issue within all . . . countries”).
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with the minimum essential coverage provision226 and new consumer
protections, 227 could compel insurance providers to focus their efforts on
poorer communities because the newly insured and chronically ill might
stimulate market activity. In the process, ACA could compel the private
industry to confront health inequity by increasing its interactions with
vulnerable populations, and the limited capacity of insurers to change the
many systemic barriers to health228 could encourage insurers to concentrate
their efforts on changing individual behavior. 229 In this way, ACA is a
manifestation of well-calculated libertarian paternalism because it obliges
private entities to work toward improving individual health care choices
without diminishing individual choice. 230 Unfortunately, improved health
is more than a simple matter of better choices,231 and insurers and
employers cannot single-handedly reshape every health outcome in
vulnerable populations. 232 Moreover, based on the volatility of the current
debate in the United States, 233 it is unrealistic to assume that ACA will
imbue insurers and employers with a strong enough sense of solidarity to
cultivate the political will necessary to move holistic reform forward.
D. Health Is Vital to Life, International Influence, and the Democratic
Process
Because ACA relies on personal autonomy to improve health
outcomes, 234 it fails to meaningfully address social determinants of health.
226. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010) (establishing the “minimum essential coverage”
requirement), held unconstitutional by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
227. The prohibition against disqualifying individuals based on preexisting conditions is
among the most relevant consumer protections. Id. § 18001 (providing for “[i]mmediate access to
insurance for uninsured individuals with a preexisting condition”), held unconstitutional as not
severable by Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
228. See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 1
(discussing various obstacles to better health).
229. This Comment observes that ACA seeks to empower consumers through financial
measures in the shadow of European nations, which have sought to involve the public through
direct decision making about the governance of health systems. See Gillian M. Craig, Editorial,
Involving Users in Developing Health Services: Representation Is Not Enough; Voices Must Be
Translated into Action, 336 BRIT. MED. J. 286, 286−87 (2008) (noting that “[m]any European
countries involve the public in decision making processes as part of health systems governance,”
even though certain initiatives “amount to little more than an ‘empty ritual’”).
230. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4−6 (2009) (defining libertarian
paternalism as the process of designing policies that enhance freedom of choice while influencing
institutions to improve the choices that individuals make).
231. See infra Part II.D.
232. See supra Part I.C.1.
233. See supra Part II.A.
234. See supra Part II.C.

2011]

DYING FOR DOLLARS

1117

In this instance, poor governance undermines the international reputation of
the United States and the integrity of its democratic process.235
Improving daily living conditions requires more than better decision
making because individuals often play passive roles in the conditions that
negatively impact their lives. For example, urban air pollution236 and
unsafe water and sanitation237 all have a major impact on health. Likewise,
inadequate nutrition may have lifelong effects beginning as soon in life as
gestation, and early undernutrition is associated with an increased risk for
chronic disease 238 and lower overall developmental and cognitive
aptitudes. 239 Poor nutrition and especially obesity later in life also have
serious influences on health and wellness in the United States. 240 So-called
lifestyle diseases and hunger are not entirely within the individual’s control
in light of systemic barriers that complicate access to quality foods.241
Further, daily living conditions outside individual control also shape mental
health and thus individuals’ perception and ability to cope with daily living
conditions of their own choosing throughout their lives. 242
Health is also a major factor in the ability of the United States to
influence the global community. The State’s function in regulating health
has burgeoned alongside health’s enhanced political relevance,243 and

235. Although this Comment analyzes the deleterious effects of health inequity on America’s
domestic and international interests, it does not intend to downplay moral justifications for more
holistic reform such as a shared interest in human flourishing. See J.P. Ruger, Ethics and
Governance of Global Health Inequalities, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY COMMUNITY HEALTH 998,
998−99 (2006) (exploring a moral foundation for addressing the ethical challenges that face the
global health community and placing the Hobbesian tradition, John Rawls’s relational perspective,
and principles of cosmopolitanism in the philosophical framework for global health).
236. Aaron J. Cohen et al., Urban Air Pollution, in 2 COMPARATIVE QUANTIFICATION OF
HEALTH RISKS: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BURDEN OF DISEASE ATTRIBUTABLE TO SELECTED
MAJOR RISK FACTORS 1353, 1354 (Majid Ezzati et al. eds., 2004).
237. Annette Prüss-Üstün et al., Unsafe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, in 2 COMPARATIVE
QUANTIFICATION OF HEALTH RISKS, supra note 236, at 1321, 1321.
238. Stephen M. Fishman et al., Childhood and Maternal Underweight, in 2 COMPARATIVE
QUANTIFICATION OF HEALTH RISKS, supra note 236, at 39, 41.
239. Id. at 99.
240. Researchers have associated being overweight with increased risk for type II diabetes,
heart disease, hypertensive disease, stroke, and certain cancers such as breast and colon cancer.
W. Philip T. James et al., Overweight and Obesity (High Body Mass Index), in 2 COMPARATIVE
QUANTIFICATION OF HEALTH RISKS, supra note 236, at 497, 498.
241. See Pothukuchi, supra note 222, at 357 (observing four streams of food production and
distribution that determine the availability of different foods in the community).
242. See Gavin Andrews et al., Child Sexual Abuse, in 2 COMPARATIVE QUANTIFICATION OF
HEALTH RISKS, supra note 236, at 1851, 1851 (noting that researchers have widely attributed the
cause of depression, panic disorder, alcohol abuse and dependence, drug abuse and dependence,
and suicide to victimization experiences such as childhood sexual abuse).
243. See Ilona Kickbusch, Editorial, Responding to the Health Society, 22 HEALTH
PROMOTION INT’L 89, 90 (2007) (discussing the pronounced role of the State in health as
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increased regulation has been mediated by more health-focused leadership
roles in government. 244 Simultaneously, leaders from nations around the
world increasingly rely on one another to confront social determinants of
health that are progressively beyond a single nation’s domain. 245 By
ignoring health equity, the United States damages its status on the
international stage while the global community increasingly recognizes
health as an essential element of responsible governance.246 Population
health emanates from careful policymaking that accounts for structures of
political power and globalization.247 Without meaningful reform, the
United States destabilizes initiatives abroad because global health requires
interdependence and because world leaders must work together to ensure
health equity is financed and fairly resourced. 248
The American approach also detracts from the health of its
government. Personal health determines one’s capacity to participate in the
democratic process. 249 Without better health through proper reform,
individuals are more likely to be passive members of representative
democracies, and elected officials are less likely to embody the full range of
constituent needs. 250 In the absence of proper representation, policy
evidenced by new regulations such as the Spanish government’s monitoring of fashion models’
body mass indexes and the total ban on smoking in public places implemented in Ireland).
244. See id. at 91 (listing Canada, England, Sweden, and Australia as nations that have fostered
health through meaningful health-focused roles for political officials).
245. See id. (emphasizing that a sense of collective responsibility is necessary to address health
on the international stage and examining how a single nation’s neglect of this responsibility could
compromise the efforts of all other nations).
246. See id. at 89 (noting the increased attention paid to health in all levels of governance and
offering health as a central factor in modern economies and a major component of citizens’
expectations of government).
247. See Gro Harlem Brundtland, Foreword to HEALTH POLICY IN A GLOBALISING WORLD, at
xix, xix (Kelley Lee et al. eds., 2002) (remarking that the health field exemplifies the shared
consequences of globalization and suggesting that worsening health arises from increased
marginalization).
248. See COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 13
(recommending that nations increase public financial support for social determinants of health,
build on international financing for health equity using a social-determinants-of-health framework,
and allocate governmental resources for action pursuant to these recommendations).
249. See Michelman, supra note 79, at 677 (arguing that participation in democratic society
hinges on satisfying basic needs, such as health and shelter).
250. For a more extensive treatment of representative defects in the democratic process, look to
the voluminous literature on United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See,
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985) (arguing
that Carolene Products represents a line of cases through which “the court is trumping the
statutory conclusions of the deeply flawed real-world legislature by appealing to the hypothetical
judgment of an ideally democratic legislature”); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1289−92 (1982) (remarking that
Justice Stone’s opinion in Carolene Products “extend[ed] the scope of judicial review not in terms
of the special value of certain rights but in terms of their vulnerability to perversions by the
majoritarian process” (footnote omitted)). As Lewis F. Powell, Jr., explained in Carolene
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continues to veer away from improved health equity because the United
States’s health policy is a necessary byproduct of its politics.251 This
process defect could stifle a number of transformative developments,
including future historical moments akin to President Roosevelt’s Second
Bill of Rights, 252 while simultaneously eroding the likelihood of future
reform. 253
E. A Different Approach to Health Reform
Health does not observe the same boundaries as the medical
profession. 254 Health is a factor of location, governance, financial
resources, political action, and social justice.255 Accordingly, true health
reform demands a multitier approach. 256 Fortunately, ACA is not the final
word in American reform; responsible health policy can emerge from
incremental steps toward health equity and an enhanced understanding of
health in various facets of government. 257
Good health is a salient manifestation of justice in modern society
because it represents responsible governance and the fair distribution of
resources and action. Correspondingly, health reform calls for justice
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982), the revelatory justification underlying the
use of strict scrutiny in judicial review emerged from Justice Stone’s Carolene Products opinion:
The fundamental character of our government is democratic. Our constitution assumes
that majorities should rule and that the government should be able to govern.
Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state legislatures should be allowed to do
as they choose. But there are certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the
political process. And the political process therefore cannot be trusted to protect these
groups in the way it protects most of us.
Id. at 1088−89.
251. See supra notes 69−70 and accompanying text; cf. Carey, supra note 70, at 502 (asserting
a constitutional right to health care and attempting to demonstrate unlawful discrimination against
the poor in health service delivery in an effort to explain the failure of health policy reform).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 81–84.
253. But see Powell, supra note 250, at 1091 (observing that deciphering a process defect and
its consequences may require a substantive, unverifiable vision for what the process should have
yielded if not for the defect).
254. See Kickbusch, supra note 243, at 89 (delineating a boundary for the medical system
while framing the territory of health as “ever less tangible and increasingly virtual”).
255. See COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 1 (attributing
disparate health outcomes “between and within countries” to uneven distribution of power,
money, access to goods and services, misdistribution of health care, climate change, and damaging
life circumstances and health policies).
256. See, e.g., id. (asserting that economic “growth by itself, without appropriate social policies
to ensure reasonable fairness in the way its benefits are distributed, brings little benefit to health
equity”).
257. See Gail R. Wilensky, Health Care Reform—Where Do We Go from Here?, 362 NEW
ENG.
J.
MED.
e36(1),
36(3)
(Mar.
18,
2010),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1002211 (suggesting that a clear lesson from
congressional enactment of ACA is that Americans prefer incremental reform).
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through enhanced gender equality 258 and political empowerment for all
community members. 259 Legislatures will never fully reform health by
grounding their remedies in individual autonomy. 260 To improve daily
living conditions and achieve true health reform, policymakers must
transform childhood development and expand intervention early in life,261
address environmental contributors to poor health, 262 foster fair
employment opportunities, 263 and initiate social protection schemes that
ensure individuals have enough income to lead healthy lives. 264 These
improvements are necessary, in addition to efforts to ensure universal
access to health care, which also must meaningfully address social
determinants of health.265
Although poor health represents a defect in the democratic process,266
it is not an insurmountable barrier to improving health policy. “The right to
adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good
health” had a place in President Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights,267 to
which scholars have attributed major legislative developments such as the
G.I. Bill. 268 Even without a constitutional guarantee to positive rights,269
Congress has a moral imperative to pass laws that advantage its
constituents. 270 Decades may elapse before lawmakers reunite their focus
258. See COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 16 (asserting
that nations must address gender inequities in the structure of society through increased
investment in sexual and reproductive health services and programs).
259. See id. at 18 (evidencing the need to redistribute social power to improve health and
offering a framework for achieving the “political empowerment that underpins social well-being
and equitable health”).
260. See supra Parts II.C–D.
261. See COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 4 (calling for a
comprehensive approach to early life that utilizes and extends existing programs and
interventions).
262. See id. (advising policymakers to place health at the center of urban planning and
governance, eliminate inequity in rural and urban areas, and ensure that economic and social
responses to environmental degradation address health equity).
263. See id. at 6 (recommending full and fair employment policies that take into account a
healthy work-life balance and safe working conditions).
264. See id. at 7 (noting that comprehensive social policies that support the provision of a
sufficient income for healthy living are instrumental to the success of other development goals).
265. See id. at 9 (emphasizing the need to strengthen the capacity of health care systems and
workforces to act on social determinants of health).
266. See supra Part II.D.
267. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 13 (articulating the various components of President
Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights).
268. See id. at 15 (arguing that the G.I. Bill, “which offered an array of housing, medical,
educational, and training benefits,” was among the most prominent legislative fixes attributable to
the Second Bill of Rights); see also supra note 83 (describing the G.I. Bill).
269. See supra Part I.B.1.
270. See Ruger, supra note 235, at 1001 (arguing that global actors and institutions are
obligated to address health inequities).
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behind health, and it may take even longer for Americans to recast health as
something more than a commodity, but strides on the international stage
provide bases to anticipate progress in this arena. 271
Lessons from the passage of ACA, the law’s reception among the
general public, and subsequent state challenges to the law suggest that
dramatic improvements to American health will not take shape in a single
measure in the near future. Improving health is a matter of recognizing its
bidirectional relationship to most aspects of life and making it a priority at
all levels of modern governance. 272 From social protection schemes to
environmental regulation, health equity is ubiquitous in policymakers’ daily
work. Systemic fixes could accompany legislation designed to address
issues that are contemporaneous to the American political consciousness,
including safeguards to fair employment. 273 All actors should ensure
health equity is financed and fairly resourced, 274 and global leaders must
work together to achieve the goal of health equity. 275
Thus, lawmakers must look beyond cost-containment and financial
incentives to attain true reform. Improving health is a complex task that
requires a coordinated approach among various sectors of numerous
countries. 276 This task must be initiated at the state level because many
social determinants of health are beyond individual control. 277 The
likelihood of one sweeping package of reforms is remote, 278 but the

271. See Anna Ritsatakis, Equity and Social Determinants of Health at a City Level, 24
HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L i81, i88 (2009) (Special Supplement on European Healthy Cities)
(analyzing Phase III of the World Health Organization’s European Healthy Cities Network and
concluding that “an undeniable shift from rhetoric to action [occurred] in at least half the cities”
included in the network, while acknowledging that the other “half still needed additional work to
clarify the concept of equity in health and its implications for policy development”).
272. See COMM’N ON THE SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 152, at 11 (offering
health as a marker of government performance and a shared value across government sectors).
273. See id. at 6 (“Through the assurance of fair employment and decent working conditions,
government, employers, and workers can help eradicate poverty, alleviate social inequities, reduce
exposure to physical and psychosocial hazards, and enhance opportunities for health and wellbeing. And, of course, a healthy workforce is good for productivity.”).
274. See id. at 12 (“Public finance to fund action across the social determinants of health is
fundamental to welfare and to health equity.”).
275. See id. at 19 (exploring the unequal benefits of globalization and arguing in favor of
multilateral efforts to address social determinants of health).
276. The government must meet its obligation to provide vital health services and regulate
potentially hazardous materials while the private sector must honor this effort in economic
agreements. See id. at 15 (calling for the State to provide basic services necessary for health and
to regulate goods such as tobacco and alcohol, but noting that public leadership must be paired
with the efforts of responsible actors in the private sector and civil society).
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See Antos, supra note 184, at 3 (predicting that Congress will not pass any major health
legislation for at least two years).
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opportunity for daily improvements is directly proportional to the enormous
potential for positive change in American health.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the state challenges to the law should fail, 279 ACA is a costcontainment mechanism when the United States needs systemic reform.280
ACA could contribute to a new era for health care by transforming business
objectives and redefining the principles of personal responsibility and
solidarity in the country’s health system, but progress will be limited.281
Additional legislation that addresses the social determinants of health is
necessary to fortify the United States’s international reputation and
Moreover, health is a pivotal aspect of
democratic integrity. 282
contemporary governance that requires careful policies, collaboration, and
the fair representation of all voices because, in modern society, individual
health is a matter of our shared reliance on social justice. 283 Because poor
governance destroys lives, lawmakers have the moral imperative to confront
health equity. 284
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